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Abstract
Individual-level explanations of electoral participation typically argue that non-
voting is determined by a combination of facilitative and motivational factors. We 
advance the argument that, beyond individual characteristics, there are pivotal 
contextual features which enable or impede individual action through specific 
incentive structures. Thus, contextual factors influence the individual propensity 
to vote or to abstain. For the first time the data of Selects 2003 allows for the testing 
of contextual effects, at least on the cantonal level. Several multilevel analyses 
show that high party competition, compulsory voting, and strong Catholicism 
foster individual participation. The findings clearly indicate that an individual’s 
propensity to vote is influenced by personal characteristics as well as by cantonal 
attributes.
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Introduction
In this article we focus on individual electoral participation at the Swiss 
federal elections of 2003. More specifically, we investigate the determinants 
of an individual’s propensity to vote by looking at individual and contextual 
characteristics.
For more than thirty years the majority of the Swiss have not gone to the polls 
during national elections. In 2003, only 45.2% of all Swiss citizens exercised their 
right to vote. In international comparisons, Switzerland, together with the USA, 
appears at the end of the turnout ranking list (cf. Freitag 1996). However, if we 
take a look at the sub-national level (the Swiss cantons), we can observe striking 
differences in turnout rates at national elections in the different cantons. In 2003, 
turnout varied around the national mean of 45.2%, from 25.3% in Glarus to 
63.2% in Schaffhausen. How can we explain these sub-national level differences? 
Are the citizens of the canton Zug (52.6%) more interested in politics, therefore 
showing a greater propensity to vote than the citizens of the canton Appenzell 
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Inner-Rhodes (35.1%)? Does the specific institutional setting in the canton of 
Valais (53.6%) foster the individual’s willingness to go to the polls to a higher 
degree than the different institutional setting in the canton of Grisons (39.1%)? 
Three reasons demonstrate the relevance of an empirical investigation in 
seeking to answer these kinds of questions. First, although the turnout rate 
in Switzerland is very low, empirical research on electoral participation in 
Switzerland is surprisingly rare (Bühlmann et al. 2003). If “participation is the 
lifeblood of democracy” (Franklin 2002: 148), the reasons and sources of the low 
Swiss turnout should be of interest.1 Cantonal comparisons could even be seen as 
a ‘terra incognita’ of participation research (exceptions in this regard are Freitag 
(2005) and Wernli (1998, 2001)). This contribution aims to fill this research gap.
Second, besides the strikingly low Swiss electoral turnout and the differences 
in turnout rates between the cantons, it is worth specifying another Swiss 
particularity. The 26 cantons are considered as 26 different political systems 
(Kriesi 1998; Klöti 1998), not only in terms of the institutional settings, but also in 
terms of the decision-making processes for national elections (Caramani 1996). 
Any attempt to explain an individual’s propensity to vote must take into account 
the differences in the context in which the individual lives. We mainly assume 
that different contextual settings will have different impacts on individual 
participation. We also expect different interactions between contextual and 
individual characteristics. In other words: differences in individual resources 
play a key role in explaining individual participation behaviour, but the latter 
also depends on the canton in which a person lives. On the one hand the cantonal 
context builds a framework which fosters or hinders the individual’s propensity 
to vote, and on the other hand, the effect of individual resources on participation 
also differs from context to context.
Third, we advance a methodological argument. We hypothesise that an 
individual’s propensity to vote is influenced by both his personal characteristics 
as well as by contextual attributes. Individual-level explanations of electoral 
participation on the one hand typically argue that non-voting is determined by 
a combination of facilitative and motivational variables. Motivational factors as 
such include ideology, political attitudes, and basic tendencies, whereas facilitative 
determinants refer to specific individual resources and socio-demographic 
factors (education, income, age etc.) (Kleinhenz 1995; Knight and Marsh 2002). 
Macro-level approaches, on the other hand, evaluate the determinants of total 
1 Of course, especially in the case of Switzerland, citizens have many other possibilities of 
excerting influence on political decisions than simply through electoral participation alone. 
Among other things, the low turnout in Switzerland is often explained by the possibilities 
of exerting direct influence at the polls (Oppenhuis 1995). However, electoral voting is still 
the most significant form of political participation worldwide and the one which forms the 
basis for all democratic systems.
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voting turnout rather than focusing on the individual (Franklin 2002; Norris 
2002). In this strand of research, cross-country variance is explained by cultural, 
economic, and – most importantly – politico-institutional settings (Blais and 
Dobrzynska 1998; Crepaz 1990; Franklin 2002; Freitag 1996, 2005; Norris 2004; 
Wernli 1998). While micro-level research neglects the contextual framework 
within which individual actions take place, macro-level approaches face the risk 
of ecological fallacies. Against this background, we argue that non-voting has to 
be explained by both individual and contextual characteristics. Moreover, the 
environmental context also functions in an interactive manner, influencing the 
strength of the effect of individual characteristics on participation.
By combining individual and contextual determinants of electoral participation 
and modelling them simultaneously with multilevel analysis, we contribute to 
the overcoming of the “midlife crisis” facing electoral studies (Curtice 2002: 6). 
We see multilevel analysis as a possibility to overcome the micro-macro dualism 
widely discussed in social sciences. With multilevel analyses, the determinants 
of individual behaviour can be analysed in a much more appropriate manner 
than with simple micro-analyses or macro-analyses (Hank 2003). 
For the first time, data on the 2003 Swiss elections allows the influence of 
the cantonal contexts on individual participation to be tested. We can therefore 
go further than the very rare existing studies on electoral participation in 
Switzerland, which are conducted either on the aggregate (Freitag 2005; Wernli 
1998, 2001) or the individual level (Ballmer-Cao and Sgier 1998; Bühlmann et al. 
2003). 
This contribution is divided into four sections. Before we turn to a short 
description of our method and our results we discuss the existing theoretical 
and empirical contributions to our investigation (next section). Our last section 
offers conclusions and outlines for future research.
Individual and contextual determinants of electoral participation: the 
theoretical background
We argue that the cantonal differences in the individual’s propensity to vote can 
be explained by at least two conditions: 
First, we suggest that the cantons’ different characteristics constitute 
different stimuli for voting propensity. Different starting positions in the vote 
race, different institutional settings, cultural backgrounds, socio-demographic 
constellations, and economic situations can be seen as different factors which 
influence an individual’s propensity to participate in the federal elections. 
Second, we assume an interaction between individual resources and contextual 
stimuli: we investigate the question of how different contextual frames influence 
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the strength of the impact of individual resources on individual participation 
behaviour (cross-level interactions).
To test these suggestions, we need to analyse individual and contextual 
determinants of individual participation behaviour simultaneously. We 
initially analyse the individual-level determinants explaining individual voting 
propensity. 
Individual resources as a condition for voting propensity
Most of the contributions analysing electoral participation have found the same 
couple of determinants to be important for an individual’s decision to participate. 
The most important individual characteristics, attitudes, and dispositions can 
be embraced in five bundles of resources (Bühlmann 2006; Knight and Marsh 
2002; for an overview on the schools and approaches in participation research 
see Bühlmann et al. 2003).
• Since Lazarsfeld et al. (1949), socio-economic status (SES) has played a 
prominent role in explaining both the decision to vote and participation behaviour. 
Normally, socio-economic status consists of the individual’s educational level, 
income, and her occupational status. In theory, a high SES leads to a higher 
propensity to participate in elections, because individuals with high education 
levels and/or with a high income have more disposable time and a greater 
capacity to understand political debates (Kleinhenz 1995). This leads not only 
to greater political interest, but also to a greater probability of participation. 
Furthermore, wealthy individuals have an interest in contributing to the stability 
of the political system by participating in it (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). 
• Political skills are seen as the most important resource of participation 
(Bühlmann 2006): individuals with a lot of political interest (Campbell et al. 1976; 
Lazarsfeld et al. 1949) and internal efficacy (Campbell et al. 1976) make wider 
use of all the different possibilities of influencing politics - including electoral 
participation - than uninterested individuals or persons who do not think they 
have the ability to participate in politics.2
• Political attitudes play a crucial role in the decision to vote. Since Campbell 
et al. (1976), party ties have been considered long-term factors which stabilise 
electoral choices. However, party ties are also important for participation (Dalton 
et al. 1984). People with only weak, or no party identification at all, show a lower 
propensity to participate in elections (Pattie and Johnston 1998). An important 
and widely discussed (especially in German political science (Feist 1992))3 factor 
2 We measure internal efficacy by conducting a factor analysis with both a question on 
respondents’ levels of information regarding the elections and a question on the respondents’ 
assessment of the intricacy of politics (see appendix for further details).
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is the attitude that voting is a civic duty. If participation in elections is seen as the 
fulfilment of one’s duty as a citizen, the propensity to vote increases. 
• At the beginning of survey research, social integration was still regarded as 
a prerequisite of political participation (Campbell et al. 1976; Key 1952; Verba 
and Nie 1972). We can distinguish between three different developments: (1) 
socio-political integration, i.e. membership in vested interests such as parties 
and/or unions. This goes hand in hand with a specific political socialisation 
and a higher probability of contact with political peers. Both lead to a greater 
propensity to participate (Verba et al. 1978). (2) The second development begins 
with the assumption that politically relevant affiliations to specific classes are 
disappearing. Therefore, integration in social ‘everyday networks’ also becomes 
politically relevant (Peterson 1990). Individuals without any social contact, 
whether in primary groups (spouse, family) or in secondary groups (friends, 
neighbours) are not integrated and no longer take part in social and political life 
(Kleinhenz 1995). The individual’s mobility also plays an important role within 
this discussion: persons who have lived in the same place for a long time are more 
socially integrated and display more attachment and commitment. Relocation 
goes hand in hand with the loss of integration in neighbourhood networks. 
What follows is a decline of the propensity to participate (Glaeser et al. 2000). 
(3) The two developments mentioned show a high proximity to social capital 
research, where social integration is an important core concept. In a Tocquevillian 
perspective, organisations are seen as ‘schools’ where members learn the rules 
of democratic behaviour (Paxton 2002). From this perspective, integration into 
formal and informal organisations not only helps to train communication and 
cooperation skills, but also causes members to develop more trust in individuals 
on the one hand, and more support for the political system on the other hand. 
Trust, at least political trust, is considered a prerequisite of participation. 
• The last bundle of resources concerns the individual’s evaluation of the political 
system. Easton (1965) considers elections an important source of legitimisation. 
The political system and its representatives obtain the citizens’ support only 
if the latter are satisfied by the output of the system (decisions and policies). 
Considering this, the declining turnout could be interpreted as an increasing 
loss of of the political system’s legitimacy (Schwartz 1973). According to Westle 
(1990) we can distinguish between short-term (e.g. trust in parliament) and 
long-term support factors (e.g. satisfaction with the political system). Individual 
support is an essential, but not sufficient condition of participation: at least some 
individuals who are satisfied with the functioning of politics do not participate, 
precisely because things are going well.  
3 The question in the German debate is whether the decline in turnout is due to a crisis 
of participation or rather to a normalisation, i.e. to a decline of the belief that participation 
is a civic duty (Eilfort 1994).
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In short, we assume the probability of individual electoral participation to be 
higher the more a person is in possession of the above resources. We furthermore 
suggest that the differences in cantonal turnout can be explained by different 
effects of these resources on individual participation in the different cantons. 
In addition, we control for age, sex, and confession. With regard to life-
cycle effects, it is assumed that younger individuals are more likely to abstain 
from voting (Kleinhenz 1995). Gender differences, in turn, are seen as both 
consequences of generation effects and of structural differences (Ballmer-Cao 
and Sgier 1998). Lastly, in the Swiss case, confession is an important determinant 
of electoral participation (Wernli 2001).  
Contextual background as a condition for the propensity to vote
Various approaches can be found in internationally comparative participation 
research which seek to explain the differing participation levels in democratic 
parliamentary elections. Clearly, three research directions – the politico-
institutional perspective, the politico-cultural approach, and the theory of socio-
economic resources – dominate the debate, while in research so far, institutional 
influencing variables have proven particularly operative and significant (Franklin 
2004; Jackman and Miller 1995; Lijphart 1997: 7; Norris 2004). In this section, we 
sum up the essential theoretical standpoints of these research perspectives.4
Politico-institutional perspective
In existing comparative electoral participation research, the most attention by 
far is paid to politico-institutional determinants (Lijphart 1997: 7). Following 
the tradition of neo-institutionalism, this approach conceives of institutions as 
‘rules of the game’ which facilitate certain action alternatives while preventing 
others. In other words: institutions, in this view, function equally as formalised 
rules and as social norms which facilitate, limit, or stimulate individual attitudes 
and actions (Immergut 1998; Mayntz and Scharpf 1995: 43). Macro-quantitative 
research generally distinguishes between politico-institutional conditions in the 
broader sense and factors concerning electoral law and administration (Norris 
2004: 153). While characteristics of the electoral, party, and government system 
belong to the former set of conditions, primarily organisational stipulations such 
4 Most of this research is clearly macro-quantitative and based on hypotheses linking 
macro-effects to assumed correlations on the micro-level. We therefore use these approaches 
as a source for possible macro-effects on individual behaviour (for a broad discussion on 
this topic see Bühlmann 2006).
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as the existence of compulsory voting belong to the second category. Advocates 
of this institutional research perspective generally look for incentives or possible 
institutionalised barriers which coincide with participation in an election (Blais 
and Dobrzynska 1998; Jackman and Miller 1995: 469; Norris 2004).
Pursuant to the Swiss constitution (Article 149.2), the electoral system is the 
same in all cantons, i.e. proportional representation (PR) is used throughout all 
of the cantons. However, the number of available seats varies greatly from canton 
to canton and corresponds to the size of the population: while in the largest 
canton, Zurich, 34 seats are allocated, the candidates in the six smallest cantons 
compete for only one seat. In practice, this situation comes close to a majority 
vote. Relevant research identifies the type of electoral system as the first relevant 
variable towards an explanation of differences in electoral participation levels 
(Siaroff and Merer 2002). Majority electoral systems are seen as barriers to high 
electoral participation, since (it is argued) elections are not controversial in safe 
constituencies or strongholds, and supporters of the previously defeated party 
or small parties stay away from the election because they consider their vote 
to be ineffective (Ladner and Milner 1999). Additionally, previously defeated 
parties reduce their mobilisation efforts. In contrast, turnout should be higher 
under proportional systems, since voters will not feel that their vote is wasted, 
more parties are likely to run, and parties will have an incentive to campaign 
everywhere (Siaroff and Merer 2002: 920). In Switzerland, single-seated cantons 
resemble majority systems. Again, in cantons with proportional systems the 
number of parties increases with the number of available seats (Wernli 2001). 
Against this background we hypothesise that an increasing number of seats 
leads to a higher propensity to vote.
Party system. In their search for the driving forces behind participation rates, 
researchers frequently refer to the competitive situation within the party system 
(Blais and Dobrzynska 1998: 249; Wernli 1998). This approach assumes that 
whilst elections with pre-determined outcomes bring about a degree of apathy 
and ignorance amongst voters, a strongly competitive inter-party situation at the 
outset has a stimulating effect.5 At the same time, the weight of each individual 
vote is argued to increase with the supposed marginality of an electoral outcome. 
In other words: the more consequences an individual vote has for an electoral 
result, it is argued, the more likely citizens are to go to the ballot (Freitag 2005). 
Furthermore, the number of parties is assumed to have an effect on electoral 
participation. The more fragmented a party system, the more multi-faceted the 
party-ideological spectrum becomes, and thus the more possibilities the voter 
has to find candidates in which he sees his interests represented and realised 
5 This does not necessarily mean that the electorate will correctly anticipate the electoral 
result. Close races also increase party efforts and media attention (Van Egmond 2003). 
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(Blais and Dobrzynska 1998: 248). Thus, a large party diversity is said to boost 
willingness to participate in political elections. Finally, a high level of electoral 
participation should be traceable to a polarised party system, since opposite 
party camps are adept at keeping their respective clientele particularly close 
(Crepaz 1990; Norris 2004: 167).
Institutions. Two competing assessments can be formulated regarding the 
influence of direct democracy on participation at parliamentary elections. The first 
conjecture assumes that a culture of active referendum democracy stimulates 
citizens’ political interest (Hajnal and Lewis 2003). Wernli (1998), for instance, 
comparing 10 Swiss cantons concludes, that electoral participation is higher in 
the cantons where a more intensive form of direct democracy is practised The 
opposite to this hypothesis is the assumption of a negative relationship between 
direct democracy and electoral democracy. At least two reasons speak for this 
claim: first, sundry popular initiatives and referenda restrict the competencies 
of government, parliament, and parties. The voter recognises that she is in a 
position to decide authoritatively on important issues, independently and 
without recourse to members of parliament. Thus, from this perspective, political 
questions are decided on primarily in referenda and not at (less relevant) elections 
(Bühlmann et al. 2003; Linder 1999: 315). Second, where there are several pillars 
of political co-determination, it is conceivable that a certain fatigue could arise 
regarding elections and referenda, mainly at the expense of less significant ballots 
(Jackman and Miller 1995: 483) and above all in cantons where the use of direct 
democracy instruments is high. Furthermore, cantons with a well-developed 
communal autonomy could be expected to ascribe little importance to national 
authorities, since the latters’ limited powers of action and decision mean that 
elections to national parliament are considered largely irrelevant.
Electoral law and administration. Among the factors concerning electoral law and 
administration, compulsory voting is particularly significant in the explanation of electoral 
participation (Lijphart 1997). On the international level, Italy and the Netherlands 
pursued this arrangement until 1993 and 1970 respectively. Today, compulsory 
voting continues to exist, for instance, in Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Costa 
Rica, Greece, Luxemburg, Lichtenstein, Mexico, Peru, Singapore, Turkey, and 
Cyprus. Among the Swiss cantons, compulsory voting exists only in the canton of 
Schaffhausen. Here, as in Australia or Belgium, citizens can be driven to vote by the 
threat of retrospective penalties.6 While regular participation in the democratic process 
leads to the acquirement of a certain political competence and to the development of an 
active citizen’s political interest (Pateman 1970; Wernli 1998), compulsory voting leads 
us to expect a higher rate of participation at ballots (Franklin 2004).
6 Cf. the electoral law 160.11, article 9 of Schaffhausen’s Code of Law: “Participation in 
federal, cantonal, and local referenda and elections, and in residents’ municipal assemblies, 
is compulsory until the age of 65. Any person who neglects this duty without an excuse 
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Socio-political and politico-cultural determinants  
Exponents of the politico-cultural and socio-integrative perspective emphasise 
that the willingness to participate in elections is not so much a result of 
institutional incentives and stimulants, as, primarily, an acquired habit (Norris 
2004: 154). Accordingly, other investigations attribute an influence on the level 
of electoral participation to socio-political and politico-cultural factors (Crepaz 
1990; Gray and Caul 2000; Siaroff and Merer 2002).
Socio-political integration characteristics. At least since Tocqueville‘s (1994) 
analyses, social science has been dealing with the significance of clubs and 
organisations for the social and political integration of individualistic societies. 
This perspective’s fundamental ideas can be traced back to the politico-cultural 
research of the 1960s, when voluntary organisations are considered to be 
“the most important foundations” of stable democracies, and were thought 
to secure the latter’s continued existence (Almond and Verba 1965: 220ff.). 
Here, organisations act not only as mediums of political socialisation, but also 
as “schools for democracy”, since they enable the “membership role” to be 
combined with the “role of citizen” in social practice. We expect cantons with a 
high density of membership, particularly in trade unions and parties, but also 
in other formal associations, to display a higher level of participation. A high 
cantonal degree of involvement in this respect is regarded as an environment 
which fosters civic behaviour, including the willingness to support the political 
system through electoral participation.
Politico-cultural characteristics. In the Swiss context, Catholicism is traditionally 
considered a significant, historically established politico-cultural driving force 
behind electoral participation. According to Wernli (1998: 96ff.), there is a 
particularly strong bond in the Swiss cantons between the Christian Democratic 
Party (CVP) and Catholics. This historically entrenched relationship dates back 
to the defeat of the Catholic coalition at the end of the Sonderbundkrieg (short 
Swiss civil war, 1847). In the aftermath of this war, the Catholic population grew 
to perceive itself as a minority subordinated to worldly and modernising forces, 
and withdrew into a kind of isolated society in the strongholds of the Catholic 
cantons (Linder 1999: 37; Geser 2004). In these cantons, federal order guaranteed 
the continuation of Catholic morals and customs. It is thought that in cantons 
with a Catholic majority, elections are perceived of as regular challenges to the 
bastion of Catholicism and essential Christian religious values. This perception, 
together with the clientelistic entanglements between party and ideology, is 
suggested to act as a mobilising force on electoral participation. In view of the 
shall be obliged to pay three Swiss francs.” According to information given by the 
Schaffhausen State Chancellery, this sum is collected by the respective citizen’s 
municipality.
22 MARC BÜHLMANN AND MARKUS FREITAG
enduring confessional-political culture in Switzerland (cf. Geser 2004), these 
connections ought also to affect more recent developments and to render political 
Catholicism a propulsive force on political participation. 
At least two reasons oblige us to take not only the confessional, but also 
the language, cleavage into consideration. First, we can distinguish between 
the cantons by their type of democratic system. In existing research, the non-
German cantons have typically been seen as representative systems, while the 
German speaking cantons pass as more direct-democratic systems (Kriesi 1998; 
Wernli 2001): not only are cantonal constitutions in the Latin areas more oriented 
towards representative democracy,  with fewer opportunities of direct legislation 
(Ladner 1991), but the direct democratic instruments also are used more seldom 
than in the German speaking cantons (Linder 1999). Second, the non-German 
cantons have minority status at the national level. We therefore suggest that 
individuals living in these cantons concentrate more on cantonal than federal 
politics, and thus tend to exercise their national voting rights less intensively. 
The first point of view leads us to expect that a higher degree of importance will 
be attached to elections, and that there will thus be a higher electoral turnout in 
Latin cantons. The second point, however, leads to contrary assumptions.
Socio-economic and socio-demographic determinants 
Besides the approaches mentioned so far, extant comparative investigations refer 
to the effect of socio-economic and socio-demographic factors on participation 
rates at political elections. Thus, for instance, economic strength and population 
size are mentioned as particularly relevant influencing variables (Blais and 
Dobrzynska 1998: 241ff.; Norris 2004; Siaroff and Merer 2002: 917). 
Economic strength and modernity. Where existing research draws upon societies’ 
cognitive and material resources to explain varying electoral participation rates, 
it refers primarily to differing levels of modernity and economic strength. A well-
functioning economic system causes positive attitudes to develop towards the 
political system, strengthens political interest, and bestows the feeling that one’s 
potential participation will be politically effective (Verba and Nie 1972: 125ff.). 
Additionally, the higher a democracy’s level of socio-economic development or 
degree of modernity, the higher will be the rate of electoral participation (Blais 
and Dobrzynska 1998: 241ff.; Siaroff and Merer 2002). With a view to population 
size, researchers assume that less densely populated areas will display lower 
electoral participation, since a scattered population is more difficult to mobilise 
and relevant information is less accessible (Blais and Dobrzynska 1998: 242ff.).
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Contextual background as an influence on the impact of individual 
resources on the propensity to vote
In the section above we expected contextual factors to exert a direct influence 
on individual participation behaviour. However, in electoral studies, cross-
level interactions are of special interest: we assume that contextual factors affect 
individual participation not only in a direct, but also in an indirect manner, by 
influencing important individual resources. 
Norris (2004: 151 f.), for example, highlights two main approaches in the search 
for an explanation of voter turnout: institutionalism and cultural modernisation 
theories. The first approach emphasises that institutions, the legal system, and 
electoral administrative procedures shape the costs and benefits of participation. 
The cultural theory approach stresses the affective aspect of participation. “The 
propensity to participate or abstain is a habit of the heart” (Norris 2004: 154). This 
habit is seen as being acquired early in life and reinforced through experiences 
within a cultural context. Norris (2004: 176) concludes that “both these factors 
contribute toward understanding patterns of political participation.” Freitag 
(2005: 686), in his comparative research study on voter turnout in Swiss cantonal 
elections, draws a similar conclusion. According to his enquiry, two of the 
main factors explaining electoral participation in Switzerland are compulsory 
voting (on the institutional side) and Catholicism (on the cultural side) (see also 
Wernli 1998, 2001). We therefore choose these two contextual characteristics to 
test the interactive effect of cantonal contextual factors on individual electoral 
participation behaviour.7
Compulsory voting is seen as an important booster for individual political 
interest and competence (Lijphart 1997; Pateman 1970; Wernli 1998, 2001). 
(Institutionally regimented) regular participation in the democratic process leads 
to the acquirement of a certain political competence and to the development of 
an active citizen’s political interest (Pateman 1970). We therefore expect the effect 
of political interest to be weaker in the canton of Schaffhausen (the only canton 
with compulsory voting) than in all other cantons without the compulsory vote. 
In other words: in terms of a diminishing marginal utility, we expect that an 
increase in individual political interest, in the sense of voting as a duty and in 
party closeness in Schaffhausen, will lead to more participation, but to a lesser 
degree than in cantons without compulsory voting. Methodologically speaking, 
we expect a negative interaction term.
7 The problem is that in contemporary electoral research, cross-level interaction theory 
simply does not exist. We therefore mainly use international and the most prominent 
contemporary Swiss empirical findings on participation (Freitag 2005; Wernli 1998, 2001) 
and deduce a few suggested cross-level effects.
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Wernli (1998, 2001) highlights the differences between Catholic and non-
Catholic cantons. He explains the higher turnout in Catholic cantons with 
stronger party ties to the dominant Catholic party (CVP) and a stronger sense of 
voting as a ‘duty to defend the bastion of Catholicism’. In Catholic-dominated 
cantons, even individuals without strong political interest go to the polls. We can 
expect this sense of voting as a duty to exert an even stronger effect on Catholics 
living in Catholic cantons. We propose that Catholicism has three different cross-
level effects: (1) based on the idea of a diminishing marginal utility, we suggest 
that an augmented prevalence of the view that voting is a civic duty in non-
Catholic cantons leads to more participation than in Catholic cantons, where 
this duty is more strongly internalised. (2) On the other hand, a large number 
of Catholics within a canton leads to a higher propensity to participate on the 
part of Catholics: the duty to defend the Catholic bastion is more internalised 
by Catholics. (3) A large number of Catholics in a canton should also affect the 
strength of the effect of a party tie. Closeness to a party is – as discussed above 
– an important factor fostering individual participation propensity. However, 
in Catholic-dominated regions, the inherent inclination to defend the bastion of 
Catholicism amplifies the effect of partisan ties. We therefore suggest a positive 
cross-level correlation effect between Catholicism and party ties.
Method
In the early days of scientific electoral research, contextual factors served as 
independent variables to explain aggregated turnout (Rice 1928; Siegfried 1949). 
The development of survey-based empirical research since the 1930ies then led 
to a paradigm shift, resulting in a stronger focus on individual behaviour and 
its explanation.8 However, ”the traditional monolithic survey-based research 
project, designed to study voting behaviour at a particular election, is seen (...) to 
8 Both methods have great disadvantages. With ecological analysis one cannot really 
explain individual behaviour (Lane and Ersson 1990) and always faces the danger of 
ecological fallacy (Robinson 1950; see also Stoker and Bowers 2002). Moreover, the 
aggregating of individual values goes hand in hand with a great loss of information (Ditton 
1998; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1993). But the survey-based method also has its pitfalls if one 
wants to analyse the influence of context. The treating of contextual variables as individual-
level data is known as the ‘‘miraculous multiplication of the number of units” (Snjiders 
and Bosker 1999: 15) and leads to several problems such as the overestimation of standard 
errors (Goldstein 1987: 19; Hox and Kreft 1994: 285; Rasbash et al. 2002), the correlation of 
the residuals, and the violation of the assumption of homogeneity of the data (Ditton 1998). 
For a more detailed discussion see Bühlmann 2006; Goldstein 1987: 19; Jones 1997; Hox and 
Kreft 1994: 285; Rasbash et al. 2002;  Snijders and Bosker 1999; Stoker and Bowers 2002.
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be approaching the end of its useful life” (Franklin and Wlezien 2002: 169). One 
possible way out of the “midlife crisis” facing electoral research (Curtice 2002: 6) 
is seen in the combination of both the macro-level and the micro-level (Bühlmann 
2006).9 The simultaneous modelling of individual and contextual determinants 
to explain individual behaviour is possible with the multilevel analysis used 
in this contribution. By considering the multilevel structure of data not as a 
nuisance but as a substance (Jones 1997), multilevel models not only distinguish 
different variations at different levels, but make it possible to measure varying 
relationships between variables based on the difference of contexts (cross-level-
interactions). 
The underlying principle of multilevel modelling is quite simple: intercepts 
of common linear ordinary least square (OLS)-regression analysis are allowed 
to vary. 
(1)  yij = b0j + b1X1ij + eij , where
(2)  b0j= b0+ m0j   (m0j stands for the residuals at the context level).
Additionally, multilevel models allow the modelling of cross-level interaction, 
measuring the influence of contextual factors on the strength of connection 
between response and predictor variables (methodologically speaking the 
steepness of the slope). 
Our dependent variables have a dichotomous form.10 Therefore, we do not 
use OLS-regression for our estimation, but transform the dependent variable in 
a logit structure. Estimation and interpretation for logit multilevel analysis are 
similar to those used in conventional logit analysis (see for example Long 1997).
We proceed – in accordance with our initial questions – in three steps: first, 
we test the explanatory strength of the individual resources, controlling for non-
specified contextual effects11: 
(3) logit(pij) = b1 + b2X2ij + ... + bnXnij + eij + m0j  
9 Of course, the idea that context influences individual behaviour is not new at all. It 
has been crucial at least since the suicide analysis by Durkheim (1960 [1897]). However, 
corresponding quantitative analyses in political science in the past century lacked the 
methodological basis to properly analyse contextual effects. 
10 Individual participation propensity is measured by the following question: ‘‘In general, 
about half of all eligible voters go to the polls at national elections. What about you: did 
you take part in the national elections on October 19th or not?” The measurement of all 
independent variables can be found in the appendix. 
11 The respondents were asked in which canton they are entitled to vote. The number 
of individuals per canton does not fall below the methodologically required number of 25 
level-1-subjects per, at least, 25 level-2-objects (Jones 1997).  
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The participation probability of an individual i within a municipality j (pij) 
is explained by an overall participation mean (b1), individual characteristics (X, 
their estimates b respectively), individual variation (eij with an assumed mean of 
0 and a total within-context variance of s2), and contextual variation (m0j with an 
assumed mean of 0 and a total between-context variance of su2).
Second, we specify the contextual level with contextual factors (W, their 
estimates a respectively).
(4) logit(pij) = b1 + b2X2ij + ... + bnXnij + a1W1j + ... + anWnj + eij + m0j 
 
Finally, we estimate the cross-level interaction with the selected individual 
(k) and contextual variables (k) (WkjXkij , their estimates g respectively). Note 
that in those cases we model a varying effect of the individual variable Xk on 
participation (denoted by the j of the estimate). 
(5) logit(pij) = b1 + b2X2ij + ... + bkjXkij + ... + bnXnij + a1W1j + ... + anWnj 
                                       + g1WkjXkij + m1j Xkij +eij + m0j      
We forgo a deeper discussion on the method and refer to the relevant 
literature on multilevel analysis in general (Goldstein 1987; Jones 1997; Snijders 
and Bosker 1999) and on multilevel analysis with logit structures (Goldstein 
1991; Guo and Zhao 2000).
Results
Table 1 summarises two of our three steps. The results of our contextual analyses 
can be seen in columns 3 to 8 (model 2 to model 7). The individual analysis is 
summarised in column 2 (model 1): as expected, political skills are of great 
importance for individual participation. Individuals with a high level of political 
interest and individuals who evaluate themselves as being able to influence the 
political system have a much higher propensity to go to the polls than persons not 
interested in politics and persons without a sense of efficacy. However, and somewhat 
surprisingly, after the discussion in the framework of the ‘Normalisierungsthese’, 
the strongest influence on the probability of individual participation in elections is 
exerted by the sense of the ‘duty to vote’. The probability that an individual will 
go to the polls is higher (ceteris paribus) in cases where the individual fully agrees 
with the statement that participating in elections is a civic duty than in cases where 
she does not agree with this statement. Party ties also exert an enhancing effect on 
the individual’s propensity to participate. 
The effects of the variables labelled as ‘social capital’ terms do not evenly 
foster individuals’ participation: while the somewhat weak factors ‘trust’ and 
‘involvement’ show no effect, the more sturdy ‘political membership’, ‘residential 
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stability’, the fact of not living alone (labelled as ‘civil status’), and – most importantly 
– the ‘frequency of discussions on politics’, exert a boosting effect on the individual’s 
propensity to vote. Finally, the variables measuring trust and satisfaction with the 
political system and its representatives also show explanatory strength for the 
individual’s decision to go to the polls. Three further aspects are worth noting: first, 
if we take a look at the predisposition variables, we can observe that the probability 
to vote accumulates with increasing age. Neither sex nor confession meet the 99%-
significance criterion. Second, the SES measures, once controlled for all the other 
variables, no longer explain differences in individual participation. Neither a high 
level of education nor a high income seem to be a prerequisite of participation at 
the 2003 Swiss national elections. Third, the significant contextual level variance in 
model 1 reveals the appropriateness of the multilevel approach for analysing the 
electoral participation in Swiss national elections.
To avoid the methodological problems involved in testing the contextual 
effects on individual participation – above all the problems of multicollinearity12 
- we build several models with our variables measuring the different theoretical 
influences, step by step, on the basis of model 2.13 In the model with all electoral and 
party system variables (model 2), only ‘party competition’ meets the significance 
criterion: the greater the gap between the percentages of votes attained by the two 
strongest parties in a canton, the lower is the individual’s propensity to vote. The 
number of seats, number of parties, and polarisation do not explain the variance 
of individual participation between the cantons. Compulsory voting fosters 
individuals’ participation, while measures installed by the government system 
(the offer and use of direct democracy and the degree of decentralisation) show no 
influence (model 3). As on the individual level, partisanship is also important at the 
cantonal level. A high density of partisanship seems to contribute to a higher degree 
of politicisation in society, fostering an individual’s propensity to vote (model 4). 
However, the partisanship density no longer shows any explanatory strength in the 
final model (model 7). 
Taking a look at the politico-cultural characteristics (model 5), we can see the 
fostering effect of Catholicism also observed by Wernli (1998, 2001): the larger the 
number of Catholics in a canton, the greater the probability that an individual living 
in this canton will go to the polls. Taking a look at the individual level, where we 
saw that Catholics apparently have a lower propensity to vote than non-Catholics 
(significant at the 95% level only), the result is surprising.14 
12 It is important to remember that the analysis of the contextual effects – even with a 
multilevel structure – is based on only 26 cases. We therefore build only models with five 
explanation variables at the contextual level, and enlarge the significance level to 90%. 
13 Alternative modelling with mixed variables leads to the same final model (model 7). 
14 Additionally, this result clearly shows the danger of ecological fallacies, which can be 
avoided by multilevel modelling. 
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We will discuss this result later. Finally, none of the socio-economic and socio-
demographic determinants in model 6 exert an effect on an individual’s propensity 
to vote. In the final model, model 7, we put the four cantonal characteristics together. 
While partisanship density loses its explanatory strength, competition, compulsory 
voting, and Catholicism can clearly be seen as boosters of individuals’ propensity to 
go to the polls: an individual A with the same individual resources as individual B, 
but living in the canton with the highest party competition, is more likely to vote. 
Living in the canton Schaffhausen increases the participation probability15 and an 
individual living in the canton with the highest number of Catholics (canton Uri) 
is more likely to go to the polls than an individual living in the canton with the 
lowest number of Catholics (canton Berne).16 These three contextual variables are 
capable of explaining a large amount of variance in participation between the 
cantons (see the no more significant contextual-level variance).17
In order to test for cross-level interactions, we proceed in two steps. First, 
we test for the basic premise of cross-level interactions, i.e. that the individual 
resources under suspicion (interest, ‘duty to vote’, confession, and party ties) 
exert different effects on individual participation propensity in different cantons. 
We do this on the basis of model 7 (in table 1).18 Second, and again on the basis of 
model 7, we investigate the different cross-level effects. 
The tests of the basic premise are positive: the effect of individual political 
interest, of the ‘duty to vote’, of confession, and of party ties varies significantly 
(at least at the 95% level) between the cantons (see models 8 – 11 in table 2). This 
means that an increase of these four individual resources in fact leads, in all 
cantons, to a higher individual propensity to participate. However, the strength 
of these effects varies widely from canton to canton: the slope variance of all four 
variables is significant at the 95% level. That means that an increase of political 
interest, of the ‘duty to vote’, of confession, and of party ties leads to a higher 
individual propensity to vote in some cantons than in other cantons. Additionally, 
political interest, the ‘duty to vote’, and party ties show a significant negative 
covariance: in cantons where the mean individual propensity to participate is 
15 Although non-voters only have to pay a symbolic fine of three Swiss Francs, it is 
worthwhile to note that compulsory voting seems to foster turnout. 
16 It is worth noting that the effects on the individual level stay the same. 
17 In addition to the analyses reported in this paper, we have tested the electoral success 
of the Swiss People´s Party (SVP). In fact, estimations not shown here reveal a mobilisation 
effect of the SVP: the higher the vote share of the SVP in the election of 2003 compared to 
the election of 1999 in a given canton, the more an individual was inclined to vote in this 
canton in 2003. However, adding this variable in our model 7 does not change the reported 
results.  
18 We excluded partisanship density from our model. There are no changes in the results 
when we integrate partisanship density. 
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high (methodologically speaking, where the intercept takes a high value), an 
increase of political interest, of the notion that participation is a civic duty, 
and of the strength of an individual’s party tie, lead to a greater probability of 
participation, but to a lesser degree than in cantons where the mean individual 
propensity to vote is lower (figure 1). Figure 1 shows that the variation between 
the cantons grows, the more the individuals are interested in politics and the more 
they approach the vote as a duty. That means that the contextual characteristics 
exert a greater influence on these individuals. 
We are now interested in whether these variances in the effects are due to 
the suggested cantonal properties. Can the differences of the strength of interest, 
the ‘duty to vote’, confession, and party ties be at least partly explained by 
compulsory voting and cantonal confessional dominance?
As models 12 and 13 in table 2 show, the question has to be answered in the 
negative19, with one exception: a high number of Catholics exerts a negative 
influence on the effect of party ties on individual participation. Individuals with 
party ties are normally more likely to participate than individuals without a 
certain closeness to a party. However, for individuals living in cantons with a 
high number of Catholics, this effect is much weaker than for individuals living 
in cantons where Protestantism is the dominant confession. In some cantons the 
effect of party ties on the estimated individual propensity to vote is even negative 
(see diagram 3 in figure 1). These are precisely those cantons with the highest 
proportions of Catholics (Jura, Valais). 
Two ad-hoc interpretations of these findings are possible: first, one could 
assume that in homogeneous Catholic cantons, the CVP is clearly the strongest 
party and other parties do not have a chance of winning. This would mean that 
individuals with ties to parties other than the CVP do not vote. Second, in the last 
ten years, the strength of the CVP even in the cantons with a very high number of 
Catholics has declined. Other parties have become more and more important. In 
this case, it could be assumed that individuals with strong ties to the CVP do not 
go to the polls because they are disappointed with their party. However, their 
integration in the Catholic milieu does not permit these individuals to vote for 
another party. The only solution in this case would be abstention. Simple canton-
wise cross-tabulations seem rather to support the first assumption.
19 Some further tests, not presented here, with the dependent variables interest, ‘duty 
to vote’, and party ties show further notable results: first, all three variables vary not 
only between individuals but also between cantons. Second, compulsory voting does not 
explain the variance of interest between the cantons, and the number of Catholics does 
not significantly explain the uneven distribution of party ties and the ‘duty to vote’. The 
assumption - widely accepted in Swiss political science research - that compulsory voting 
leads to more individual political interest, and that Catholicism fosters the ‘duty to vote’ and 
party ties, cannot be reproduced with our data and method. Of course, these assumptions 
would justify the trouble of further and more intensive investigation. 
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Figure 1: Individual Probability to Vote as a Function of Political Interest / ‘Duty to Vote’ / Party 
Ties
Interest Duty-to-vote Party tie
Y-axis: predicted probability to vote (all other individual and contextual determinants = 0); 
x-axis: interest, ‘duty to vote’, party tie.
 
Conclusion
In this contribution, we have investigated the question of the differences in 
participation between the Swiss cantons at the Swiss federal elections in 2003. 
To summarise our results, we can say that Swiss federal elections are in fact 
cantonal elections. The differences in individual propensity to vote are due, at 
least partly, not only to different distributions of important individual resources 
between the citizens, but also to differences between cantonal characteristics in 
respect to the cantonal party system and the degree of competition, the electoral 
administration, and politico-cultural characteristics. 
In short: married and older members of political parties with a high level 
of political interest and political efficacy, who agree with the statement that 
voting is a civic duty, who have strong party ties, a high degree of residential 
stability, frequent political discussions, trust in the national parliament, and 
who are satisfied with the political system, show the highest propensity to vote. 
However, two individuals with exactly these individual resources will differ in 
their propensity to vote if they live in different cantons. Citizens of cantons where 
party competition and the number of Catholics are high have a stronger starting 
position, so to speak, in terms of their propensity to vote than citizens living in 
cantons without competition and with low numbers of Catholics. Compulsory 
voting also fosters individual participation. 
Additionally, we have shown that some individual resources have different 
effects on the individual propensity to vote in different cantons: political interest, 
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the ‘duty to vote’, confession, and party ties vary in their effects on individual 
electoral participation. However, we cannot explain this variance by means of 
the expected cantonal characteristics. Compulsory voting and Catholicism seem 
not to be responsible for the varying effects of political interest, confession, and 
the ‘duty to vote’. However, a high number of Catholics within a canton weakens 
the positive effect of party ties on individual participation. We assume that this 
effect is due to the specific party-system situation in Catholic cantons where 
the CVP dominates. Individuals with strong ties to the dominating party in the 
Catholic cantons (CVP) do show a high propensity to vote; however, individuals 
with party ties to other parties do not participate because the chance that their 
preferred party will win in Catholic cantons is low. 
The findings reported in this paper clearly indicate that an individual’s 
propensity to vote is influenced by both personal characteristics as well as 
cantonal attributes. In this respect, future research on individual electoral 
participation has to consider this fact not only in a theoretical but also in a 
methodological manner.
Appendix: Operationalisation of the variables
Variable Hypothesis Operationalisation and Source 1 ER2 HYP3
Dependent Variable
Participation “In general, about half of all eligible 
voters go to the polls at national 
elections. What about you: did you 
take part in the national elections on 
October 19th or not?”
Individual Level
Predispositions
Age The older an individual is, the 
higher is his/her propensity to 
vote. 
Age of respondent in years; rescaled 
on a scale of 0-1.
+ C
Gender Men have a higher propensity 
to vote than women.
Dummy: 0 for a woman, 1 for a man. + F
Confession Non-Catholics have a higher 
propensity to vote than 
Catholics.
To what confession or denomination 
do you belong? Recoded in a dummy: 
0 indicates non-Catholic; 1 indicates 
Catholic.
- F
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SES
Educational 
level
The higher an individual’s 
level of education is, the higher 
is his/her propensity to vote.
“What is the highest qualification you 
have achieved?” 13 degrees: from no 
completed school education up to 
university level; rescaled on a scale 
of 0-1. 
+ F
Income The higher the income of the 
household of an individual is, 
the higher is his/her propensity 
to vote.
11 categories of gross income: from 
below 2000 Swiss Francs per month 
up to more than 12 000 Swiss Francs 
per month; rescaled on a scale of 0-1.
+ F
Political Skills
Interest The higher an individual’s 
political interest, the higher is 
his/her propensity to vote.
“How interested are you in politics 
in general? Are you very interested, 
rather interested, rather uninterested, 
or not interested at all?” Rescaled 
on a scale of 0-1, where 1 indicates 
very interested and 0 indicates not 
interested at all. 
+ C
Internal 
efficacy
The more an individual 
develops a sense of internal 
efficacy, the higher is his/her 
propensity to vote.
A factor analysis (principal 
components) generates one 
significant factor from the following 
two variables (Eigenvalue = 1.27) 
explaining 63.5% of the variance (least 
factor loadings: .80):
• “How do you feel about your 
level of information on the national 
elections? Would you say that you 
were very well informed, rather well 
informed, rather poorly informed, or 
very poorly informed?”
• “How often do you think that 
politics are so complicated that you 
do not really understand what is 
going on? Never, seldom, sometimes, 
often, very often?”
The factor values are used as a scale. 
They are rescaled from 0 (lowest 
score) to 1 (highest score).
+ C
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Political Attitudes
Voting as a 
civic duty
The more an individual agrees 
with the statement that voting 
is a civic duty, the higher is 
his/her propensity to vote.
“How strongly do you agree with the 
following statement: in a democracy it 
is a duty for each citizen to participate 
regularly in elections. Do you strongly 
agree, rather agree, partly agree, 
rather not agree, or not agree at all to 
this statement?” Rescaled on a scale 
of 0-1: 0 indicates not agree at all; 1 
indicates strongly agree.
+ C
Party ties The more strongly an 
individual has developed 
party ties, the higher is his/her 
propensity to vote.
“How would you assess yourself: 
normally, do you feel close to a 
political party?” 1 for yes; 0 for no.
+ C
Social Capital / Involvement
Marital status Individuals living together 
with at least one other person 
have a higher propensity to 
vote than people who live 
alone. 
“What is your marital status?” and 
“Do you live with a partner?” Recoded 
as a dummy: 0 for living alone (single, 
widowed, divorced/separated); 1 for 
living with at least one further person 
(married; living with partner).  
+ C
Residential 
stability
The longer an individual lives 
in the same place, the higher is 
his/her propensity to vote.
“Since which year have you lived 
– without interruption - in your 
canton of residence?” Re-calculated 
in number of years and rescaled on a 
scale of 0-1.
+ C
Social trust The more an individual trusts 
others, the higher is his/her 
propensity to vote.
“Would you say that most people can 
be trusted or would you say that one 
can not be careful enough in relation 
with others? Please tell me your 
opinion if 0 means that one can not 
be careful enough and 10 means that 
most people can be trusted.” Rescaled 
on a scale of 0-1: 0 indicates cannot 
be careful enough; 1 indicates most 
people can be trusted.
+ F
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Discussion The more frequently an 
individual discusses politics 
with others, the higher is his/
her propensity to vote.
“During the electoral campaign, 
did you discuss the elections with 
someone, e.g. with your family, 
your friends, or your colleagues at 
work? How often did you have such 
discussions: often, sometimes, or 
seldom?” rescaled on a scale of 0-1: 
0 indicates no discussion; 1 indicates 
frequent discussions.
+ C
Informal 
involvement
The more an individual 
is involved in his/her 
neighbourhood, the higher is 
his/her propensity to vote.
“How often do you help your 
neighbours in practical ways or how 
often do your neighbours help you? 
Would you say often, sometimes, 
seldom or never?” Rescaled on a scale 
of 0-1: 0 indicates never; 1 indicates 
often.
+ F
Political 
Membership
Members of political 
associations have a higher 
propensity to vote than non-
members.
Membership recoded as a dummy: 1 
for active membership in at least one 
of the following political associations; 
0 for not a member:
“Please tell me if you are not a 
member, a member, or an active 
member of the following associations: 
labour union, employers’ association 
(Arbeitgeberverband), organisation 
for the protection of consumers’ 
rights, organisation for automobiles, 
a political party.”  
+ C
Support of Political System
Trust in 
national 
parliament
The greater an individual’s 
trust in the national parliament, 
the higher is his/her propensity 
to vote.
“I will now mention different 
important institutions and 
organisations. Please tell me in 
each case how much you trust the 
institution in question. 0 indicates no 
trust and 10 indicate full trust – the 
parliament”. Rescaled on a scale of 0 
(no trust) to 1 (full trust).
+ C
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Satisfaction 
with 
democracy
The more an individual is 
satisfied with the political 
system, the higher is his/her 
propensity to vote.
“Are you satisfied with the way 
that democracy is functioning in 
Switzerland? All in all, are you very 
satisfied, rather satisfied, not very 
satisfied, or not satisfied at all?” 
Rescaled on a scale of 0-1: 0 indicates 
no satisfaction and 1 indicates very 
satisfied. 
+ C
Contextual  Level
Electoral and Party System, Competition
Number of 
seats
The greater the number of 
seats in a canton is, the higher 
is the propensity to vote of 
an individual living in this 
canton.
Number of seats to be gained for the 
Swiss National Assembly in a canton 
(BFS); rescaled on a scale of 0-1.
+ F
Number of 
parties
The greater the number of 
parties in a canton is, the 
higher is the propensity to vote 
of an individual living in this 
canton.
Number of parties running for seats / 
a seat in the Swiss National Assembly 
(BFS); rescaled on a scale of 0-1.  
+ F
Party 
competition 
The more competitive the 
party system in a canton is, the 
higher is the propensity to vote 
of an individual living in this 
canton.
Difference between the percentages 
of votes attained by the two strongest 
parties at the 2003 Swiss federal 
elections (BFS, own calculations); 
rescaled on a scale of 0-1. 
- C
Polarization 
of party 
system
The greater the ideological 
distance between parties in 
a canton’s party system, the 
higher is the propensity to vote 
of an individual living in this 
canton.
Maximal distance on a 10 point left-
to-right-scale between the elected 
party on the left pole and the elected 
party on the right pole. Estimation of 
the left-right-position of the cantonal 
party by communal party leaders 
(Geser et al. 2003; own calculations); 
rescaled on a scale of 0-1. 
+ F
Government System, Administration
Degree 
of direct 
democracy
The greater the degree of direct 
democracy in a canton is, the 
higher is the propensity to vote 
of an individual living in this 
canton.
Index of the degree of direct 
democracy by Stutzer (1999); rescaled 
on a scale of 0-1.
+ F
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Use of direct 
democracy 
The more the direct democratic 
instruments are used in a 
canton, the higher is the 
propensity to vote of an 
individual living in this 
canton.
Mean number of cantonal polls per 
year between 1993 and 2003 (Vatter et 
al. 2004); rescaled on a scale of 0-1. 
+ F
Degree of 
decentrali- 
sation 
The more autonomous the 
municipalities in a canton are, 
the higher is the propensity to 
vote of an individual living in 
this canton.
Degree of autonomy of the 
municipalities within a canton 
(Ladner 1994; Vatter et al. 2004); 
rescaled on a scale of 0-1. 
+ F
Compulsory 
voting
In cantons with compulsory 
voting the individual’s 
propensity to vote is higher. 
Dummy with 1 for compulsory voting 
(canton Schaffhausen) and 0 for no 
compulsory voting. 
+ C
Socio-Political Integration
Union density The greater the union density 
in a canton is, the higher 
is the propensity to vote of 
an individual living in this 
canton.
Members of unions as a percentage of 
all employees in a canton for the year 
2000 (Vatter et al. 2004); rescaled on a 
0-1 scale.
+ F
Partisanship 
density
The greater the partisanship 
density in a canton is, the 
higher the propensity to vote 
of an individual living in this 
canton.
Members of political parties as a 
percentage of all inhabitants of a 
canton (Ladner 2003: 19); rescaled on 
a scale of 0-1.
+ F
Association 
density
The greater the association 
density in a canton is, the 
higher the propensity to vote 
of an individual living in this 
canton.
Members of formal voluntary 
associations as a percentage of all 
inhabitants of a canton (Bühlmann 
and Freitag 2005); rescaled on a scale 
of 0-1.
+ F
Politico-Cultural Characteristics
Catholicism The greater the permeation of 
Catholicism in a canton is, the 
higher is the propensity to vote 
of an individual living in this 
canton.
Number of Catholics as a percentage 
of all inhabitants of a canton (BFS: 
census 2000); rescaled on a scale of 
0-1.
+ C
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Language 
region
In non German-speaking 
cantons, the system tends to be 
rather representative in form. 
The individual’s propensity to 
vote in these cantons is higher.
The minority status of non 
German-speaking cantons 
weakens the importance 
of national elections. The 
individual’s propensity to vote 
in these cantons is lower. 
Dummy for German-speaking (1) and 
non German-speaking cantons (0) 
respectively (BFS: census 2000; Vatter 
et al. 2004).
+ / - F
Socio-Economic / Socio-Demographic Determinants
Population 
density
The more densely populated 
a canton is, the higher is 
the propensity to vote of 
an individual living in this 
canton.
Inhabitants per square km for the year 
2003 (BFS); rescaled on a scale of 0-1.
+ F
Percentage of 
farmers
The lower the number of 
farmers is, the more modern 
is a canton, the higher is 
the propensity to vote of 
an individual living in this 
canton.
Employees in the 1st sector as a 
percentage of all employees in the 
year 2000 (BFS); rescaled on a scale 
of 0-1.
- F
GDP The wealthier a canton is, the 
higher is the propensity to vote 
of an individual living in this 
canton.
Cantonal gross domestic product per 
capita in the year 2000 (BFS); rescaled 
on a scale of 0-1.
+ F
Unemploy- 
ment rate
The better a canton functions 
economically, the higher is 
the propensity to vote of 
an individual living in this 
canton.
Mean employment rate in % for the 
year 2002 (BFS); rescaled on a scale 
of 0-1.
- F
1 Sources are indicated for contextual variables only; all individual level variables derive from the 
Selects cross section data.
2 Expected relationship.
3 Hypothesis corroborated (C) or proven false (F).
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La participation électorale expliquée par des déterminants contextu-
els et individuels. Une analyse multiniveaux des élections fédérales 
de 2003 
Dans notre article, nous montrons que non seulement les facteurs individuels 
mais aussi les déterminants contextuels sont importants pour expliquer 
la participation. En d’autres mots: le context influence la propabilité d’un 
individu d’aller aux urnes ou de s’abstenir. Pour la première fois en Suisse, 
avec les données Selects 2003, il est désormais possible de tester les effets 
contextuels sur le comportement politique d’un individu, au moins au niveau 
cantonal. Plusieurs analyses multiniveaux montrent que plus un individu est 
âgé, plus il possède des connaissances politiques, plus il soutient le système 
politique et plus il a des liens sociaux, plus la probabilité de participer 
croît. En outre, le degré de compétititon entre les partis, l’institution du 
vote obligatoire et le catholicisme ont des effets mobilisants. Nos résultats 
démontrent donc clairement que le choix de participer aux élections est 
influencé, d’une part, par des caractéristiques individuelles et, d’autre part, 
par des propriétés cantonales. 
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Individuelle und kontextuelle Erklärungsgrössen der Wahlbeteili-
gung. Eine Mehrebenenanalyse der Nationalratswahlen 2003 in der 
Schweiz
In unserem Beitrag zeigen wir, dass sich die Bereitschaft zur individuellen 
Wahlbeteiligung sowohl auf persönliche Merkmale und Motive als auch auf 
kontextuelle Grössen zurückführen lässt. Mit Hilfe der Selects-Daten 2003 
können dabei zum ersten Mal für die Schweiz Hypothesen zum Einfluss 
kantonaler Kontexteffekte auf die Wahlbeteiligung überprüft werden. 
Die Resultate unserer Mehrebenenanalysen zeigen, dass die individuelle 
Bereitschaft zur Wahlbeteiligung umso grösser ist, je älter ein Individuum 
ist, je stärker es über politische Skills verfügt, je stärker es das politische 
System unterstützt und je feinmaschiger sein soziales Netzwerk ist. Darüber 
hinaus haben ein starker Parteienwettbewerb, die Institution der Wahlpflicht 
und ein stark verankerter Katholizismus mobilisierende Wirkung auf die 
individuelle Wahlbeteiligung. Mit diesen Befunden können wir deutlich 
zeigen, dass die Wahrscheinlichkeit, sich an Wahlen zu beteiligen sowohl 
von individuellen Charakteristiken als auch von kantonalen Eigenschaften 
abhängt.
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